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ARGUMENT

1.

Bray and Harrison do not possess qualified immunity from Appellant's
constitutional -based claims.
In addressing the legal issue of qualified immunity in their Brief, Appellees first

analyze Appellant's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for violation of his First Amendment rights.
Appellees present two principal arguments in support of their position that the trial court
properly granted summary judgment in their favor and against Appellant, namely: (1) It was
not clearly established in 2007 that a volunteer is entitled to First Amendment protection
because mere dicta is insufficient to create a "clearly established right", and (2) even if
volunteers do enjoy such first amendment protection, Bray and Harrison are still entitled to
qualified immunity because Appellant's speech does not meet the four-prong standard set
forth in Pickering v. Bd o/Educ, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). [Brief of
Appellees, pp. 22-33].
Appellees next address whether the trial court correctly ruled that Bray and Harrison
are entitled to qualified immunity from Appellant's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. Appellees argue three separate grounds in
favor of affirmation of the trial court's decision: (1) Appellant's equal protection claim is
derivative of his First Amendment claim, (2) Appellant did not show by admissible evidence
that he was treated substantially differently from other similarly situated coaches, and
(3)Appellant did not show that there was no rational basis for the alleged disparate
treatment. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 33-36].
Appellant will first respond to the arguments arising out of his First Amendment
claim and then address those related to his Fourteenth Amendment claims.
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A.

The right of a volunteer to protected free speech was clearly established
in 2007 and Appellant's speech does meet the four-prong Pickering
standard.
i.

The Anderson court clearly established that volunteers are entitled to
Pickering protection.

Appellant agrees with Appellees recitation of the general case law concerning the
doctrine of qualified immunity, the standard required of a plaintiff who disputes qualified
immunity protection, and the requirement that a plaintiff must also meet the second burden
of demonstrating that the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the
time of the offending action in question. Also, Appellant does not dispute that courts have
discretion in determining which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should
be considered first (i.e. whether a plaintiffs facts articulates violation of a constitutional right
or whether the claimed constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time of the
alleged violation). [Brief of Appellees, pp. 20-21].
However, Appellant disagrees with Appellees' contention that Anderson v. McCotter,
100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 1996) does not clearly establish a volunteer' first amendment right for
qualified immunity purposes. Appellant maintains that the Anderson court unequivocally
pronounced that non-paid volunteers are entitled to First Amendment protection under
Pickering, Id at 727. [Brief of Appellant, pp. 24-27].
While he Anderson court did state that "[w]e need not to decide whether it was clearly
established before this case that volunteers had Pickering protection, because Ms. Anderson
was not a volunteer." (Italics added). Id. at 729, the court was merely announcing that
because Ms. Anderson was not a volunteer, it need not look at whether early cases had
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established a volunteer's right to such protection.1 This statement does nothing to counter the
fact that Anderson court announced that the Tenth Circuit does, in fact, believe that volunteers
are entitled to First Amendment protection as a matter of law under dickering.
Appellant cites multiple cases in an attempt to argue that the Anderson court's express
acknowledgment that volunteers have a protected interest in First Amendment free speech is
mere dicta. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 23-24]. Appellees' citation to Hope v. Pe/^er, 536, U.S.
730, 762,122 S. Ct. 2508, 2527, 153 :. L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) is not helpful because the United
States Supreme Court's statement in that matter had to do with reliance by one court on
another court's dicta for purposes of establishing the unconstitutionality of the conduct at
issue in that case. [Brief of Appellees, p. 24]. In the instant case, Appellant has not cited to a
"different court," but has cited direcdy to a decision by the Tenth Circuit on the issue of
whether a volunteer has a "clearly established" protectable interest in free speech under the
First Amendment.
Appellees only reference three other federal cases—two from the Eleventh Circuit
and one from a federal district court in Pennsylvania—that dicta should not be relied upon
in qualified immunity cases. [Brief of Appellees, p. 24]. Appellees admit that several circuit
courts have found that dicta concerning the existence of a constitutional right can be relied

1

At some juncture, courts considering whether a constitutional right has been "clearly
established" may determine that such a right has been established even if no prior explicit
authority exists for such a determination. In other words, the clear pronouncement of such a
right by a court may rest upon application of other cases through inference and
extrapolation. See e.g. Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129,1136 (9th Or. 1992) (holding that
volunteer status is a valuable governmental benefit or privilege that may not be denied on
the basis of constitutionally protected speech); cert denied, 508 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct 2337,
124 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); Janusaitis v. Middlebury VolunteerFire Dep% 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Or.
1979) (holding that the dismissal of a volunteer firefighter for complaining about low morale
and inadequate draining
and
discipline
can violate
the
First
Amendment)).
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upon as precedent to establish that right. [Brief of Appellees, p. 25 (n. 1)] but argue that the
Tenth Circuit has not adopted such a standard. Even if such a standard has not been
adopted by the Tenth Circuit, Appellees have not cited any case law from the Tenth Circuit
that supports their own position concerning the limited value of dicta in qualified immunity
cases.
In sum, two questions must be answered in order for this Court to determine
whether the clear and unambiguous statement by the Anderson court that volunteers are
entitled to Pickering protection may be relied upon by Appellant to meet the "clearly
established" prong: (1) whether the statement is dicta, and (2) if the statement is dicta,
whether it should be excluded under Tenth Circuit case law for purposes of clearly
establishing a constitutional right.
Appellant asserts that the Anderson court's statement is not dicta. In Rohrbaugh v.
Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir.1995), the Tenth Circuit indicated that dicta are
"statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition
not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand." Id. at 1184. It is
clear that the Anderson opinion focuses considerable attention on the question of whether
volunteers are entitled to First Amendment protection (despite the fact that the court
ultimately determined that Ms. Anderson was not a volunteer). The Anderson court's
statement that volunteers are entitled to Pickering protection was made in the context of the
court's broad affirmation of the constitutional right to free speech. Anderson, 100 F.3d at
726-27. It was essential to the court's analysis to discuss and decide Ms. Anderson's actual
status (i.e. volunteer vs. paid intern) because the defendants in that case had argued that Ms.
Anderson was a volunteer, and thus not afforded First Amendment free speech protection.
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In other words, the statement that volunteers have Pickering protection was "involved with"
and "essential to the determination of the case at hand."
Even if this Court finds that the Anderson court's statement concerning volunteers is
dicta, the statement should not be excluded for purposes of determining the "clearly
established" prong of qualified immunity analysis. As previously mentioned, the statement
itself is "lucid and unambiguous" and was made to emphasize the Tenth Circuit's overall
view of the importance of First Amendment free speech.
For these reasons, this Court should determine that Anderson case "clearly
established" the constitutional right of volunteers to First Amendment protection.
H.

Appellant has established the four elements of the Pickering test.

Appellees correctly outline the four-step analysis set forth in Pickering and Connick v,
Myers, 461 U.S. 138,103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Those steps are: (1) determining
whether the speech touches on matter of public concern, (2) balancing the employee's
interest as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern against the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service it performs through
its employees, (3) assuming the balance of establishing the first two steps tips in favor of the
employee, the plaintiff has to prove that the protected speech was a motivating factor in the
detrimental employment decision, and (4) if the plaintiff makes the required showing under
step three, the burden shifts to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of the protected activity. [Brief
of Appellees, pp. 25-26].
Under the first Pickering element, Appellees posit that Appellant's speech was not
related to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community insofar as it related
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only to a small group of players involved in Lehi City's sport's league and because the speech
was "internal to the workplace." [Brief of Appellees, pp. 27-28]. Appellant counters that the
speech did concern the community insofar as participating children and their families were
potentially affected by the rule change that Appellant spoke out on, which rule change
affected the welfare of the participants.
The threshold question in assessing the free speech claim of a discharged, demoted,
or suspended government employee is whether the employee has spoken "as a citizen upon
matters of public concern" or merely "as an employee upon matters only of personal
interest." Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Speech regarding matters of mere personal interest is not
subject to protection under the First Amendment.
Determining whether speech involves a matter of public concern entails an inquiry
into the "content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record."
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. Furthermore, some inaccuracy in the content of the speech must
be tolerated. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-72.
Appellant has identified five incidents of speech at issue. These include: the Pinto
league draft, the Pinto league state tournament and the issue of whether the regular season
winner would get an automatic bid, the over pitching rule, the petition to change the league
rules for how the draft is conducted and the tournament player selected, and talking to Bray
about his altercation with another coach over whether a player was a "slow runner." If some
part of the communication addresses an issue of public concern, the First Amendment's
protections are triggered even though other aspects of the communication do not qualify as
a public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
The five incidents of speech at issue are grounded on safety issues as well as bringing
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to light areas in the little league program that he felt could be more efficiendy run such as
fairness. Appellant had an expectation of fairness and expected everyone to play the rules,
including city officials. Appellant was voicing his concern on the Pinto league draft and the
issue of automatic bids because these rules appeared to have been changed mid-season and
thus there was the appearance of arbitrary and unfounded decisions made by Blythe and
Harrison reasonably raising suspicion in the community's eye on how their government was
operating. Appellant's protest over the over pitching rule is an incident of speech that
discussed a matter of public concern regarding the safety of the children. In one of the
games where Appellant's team was involved an opposing team utilized a pitcher beyond the
allowed number of "outs" for the week. [R. 306]. Appellant raised the issue that the team
that engaged in doing this should forfeit the game not only because it was a rule but also due
to safety reasons because some overzealous coaches may sacrifice the long-term asset of a
boy's pitching arm for the short-sighted goal of the chance of winning a single game.
Appellant brought this up with Bray, who was present at the game, but Bray disagreed with
Appellant and said the game should continue. [R. 306]. Bray's decision would have prevailed
were it not for Steve Shelton overruling Bray's decision. Steve Shelton is the President of
the Utah Boy's Baseball Association and was present at the said game. Shelton considered
the rulebook and agreed with Appellant and the game was forfeited. [R. 305]. This overpitching rule impacts the health and safety of the children and therefore Appellant's speech
sufficiendy touches on a matter of public concern. Seejohnsen v. Independent School Dist. No. 3
of Rule County, 891 F.2d 1485, 57 Ed.L.Rep 1154 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the speech of
a school nurse against the school district's medication policy potentially impacted children's
health and therefore was a matter of public concern).

Digitized
byby
thethe
Howard
LawLibrary,
Library,J. J.Reuben
Reuben
Clark
Law
School,
BYU.
Digitized
HowardW.
W. Hunter
Hunter Law
Clark
Law
School,
BYU.
7 may
Machine-generated
maycontain
containerrors.
errors.
Machine-generated OCR,
OCR,

Under the second Pickering element, Appellees contend that Lehi City's interest in
preventing "disruption" of official functions (i.e. the activities sponsored by the Lehi City
Recreation Department) outweighed Appellant's interest in commenting about the rule
changes. Appellees argue that under the Rankin v. McPherson analysis, Bray and Harrison had
a superior interest in avoiding disruption of the Lehi City sports programs. [Brief of
Appellees, p. 30]. However, many of the statements relied upon by Appellees in support of
this argument are mere generalizations inferred from the record and are disputed by
Appellant and other witnesses. Even if these assertions could be substantiated, the question
remains whether under a summary judgment standard, these assertions are undisputed
material facts. The inquiry is entirely too fact specific to provide a legal basis upon which to
grant summary judgment, and Appellant has alleged that the actions taken by Bray and
Harrison were directly and only a result of Appellant's protesting of the proposed rule
changes. The revocation of his volunteer position was not to prevent the disruption of Lehi
City's recreational programs, but to punish Appellant for speaking out.
Analyzing the third Pickering element, Appellees make a blanket statement that
Appellant has provided no evidence that Appellees action to remove him as a volunteer
coach was premised on the content or topic of his speech. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 31-32].
Even if Appellant admitted in his deposition that he had become angry with Bray or used
the term "bull" in his speech, there is ample evidence in Appellant's affidavit and in the
Amended Verified Complaint that Bray had verbally represented at the end of the 2006 season
that Appellant would be allowed to coach. [R. 58, 305]. It was not until after Appellant
expressed his concerns about the 2006 rule changes that Bray took action to compile a list of
"offending" actions and Harrison informed Appellant of the decision not to select him as
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coach for the 2007 season. Regardless of Appellees' characterization of the facts, there are
sufficient facts in dispute to preclude summary judgment on this issue.
Summary judgment is appropriate "when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). This Court has stated that, "[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we analyze
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." Arnold v. Grigsby, 2010 UT App 226, f 12, 239 P.3d 294 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to these requirements, Appellees have asked this Court to analyze the facts
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Appellees'
position. There are numerous disputed facts in this case, and those facts go to the motivations,
intentions, and reasons for the parties' actions and behaviors in this case. Appellees cannot
simply rely upon their own version of the story and draw inferences therefrom to support
their legal contentions for purposes of a summary judgment motion. The trial court erred in
placing reliance upon Appellees' version of the facts and using those facts to grant summary
judgment in favor of Appellees and against Appellant.
B.

Appellant acknowledges that his Fourteenth Amendment claim is
derivative of his First Amendment claim. Appellant has shown by
admissible evidence that he was treated substantially differently from
other similarly situated coaches and that there was no alleged rational
basis for the disparate treatment.

Appellant agrees that his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is premised
on the allegation that he was engage in protected First Amendment speech and that a legal
bar to his First Amendment claim would effectively bar his equal protection claim.
Appellant points this Court to the argument contained in his initial Brief (pp. 31-32)
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in response to Appellees' argument that Appellant has not shown he was intentionally
treated differently than other similarly situated coached and that there was no rational basis
for the alleged disparate treatment.
2.

Appellant has asserted an unconstitutional policy or custom and Lehi City did
violate Appellant's constitutional rights.
Appellees present two principal arguments in favor of affirming the trial court's grant

of summary judgment. First, Appellees argue that Appellant did not show that any Lehi City
employee "acted pursuant to an unlawful official municipal policy or custom. [Brief of
Appellees, pp. 36-37]. Secondly, Appellant asserts that Lehi City did not violate any of
Appellant's constitutional rights. [Brief of Appellees, p. 37]. Appellant will address each of
these arguments in order.
A,

Lehi City employees did act pursuant to an official municipal policy or
custom.

According to Appellee, a local government can only be subject to the suit for its
employees' alleged constitutional violations "if the plaintiff shows that the employees acted
pursuant to an unlawful official municipal policy or custom." [Brief of Appellees, p. 36].
Appellee has mischaracterized the legal standard. In fact, the requirement is that the plaintiff
show that an employee acted pursuant to a local government's policy or custom and that
execution of that policy or custom inflicts the injury. See Monellv. Department ofSocial Services of
City ofNew York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ("We conclude,
therefore, that a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely
by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
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(

under § 1983."). In other words, the policy or custom itself may not necessarily be illegal or
unconstitutional, but execution of that policy or custom by the employee or agent of the
local government results in a constitutional violation.
Appellees state that Appellant has not alleged in the Verified Amended Complaint or an
appeal that Lehi City promulgated an unconstitutional policy or custom and that this failure
is fatal to his claims against Lehi City. [Brief of Appellees, p. 37]. However, it is clear from
the record that Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
contains a clear statement concerning the "policy or custom" factor and the facts supporting
such an allegation. [R. 316-18]. The trial court also briefly addressed this matter in its Ruling.
[R. 449]. Appellant respectfully points the Court to these documents in assessing the matter
of the constitutionality of Bray and Harrison in executing Lehi City's policies or customs.
B.

Lehi City's actions were violative of Appellant's constitutional rights.

Appellees' second argument actually contains several sub-arguments that can be
summarized as follows:
(1)

Bray and Harrison did not violate Appellant's first amendment rights because
Appellant's speech does not satisfy the Pickering balance test. Furthermore,
there is no legal authority to indicate that volunteers (such as Appellant) are
entitled to equal protection under the law; and even if there was such
authority, Appellant has not shown that Bray and Harrison treated Appellant
differently or that there was not a rational basis for such treatment. [Brief of
Appellees, p. 38];

(2)

Appellant's due process rights were not violated because "unpaid seasonal
volunteers" do not enjoy a liberty or due process interest in their volunteer
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status. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 36-37];
(3)

Even if due process protected extend to volunteers, Appellant did not possess
a protected property or liberty interest in his volunteer position because the
verbal promise that Appellant might be allowed a coaching position in 2007 is
insufficient to establish that Appellant had a legitimate claim to entitlement of
a benefit created by an independent state law, rule or understanding. Brief of
Appellees, pp. 39-41];

(4)

Appellant does not possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his
volunteer coaching status and reputation, alone, does not constitute a liberty
or property interest. [Brief of Appellees, p. 41];

(5)

Finally, Appellant was afforded all of the process he was due because he was
allowed to be heard by Lehi City representatives. [Brief of Appellees, p. 42].

Appellant has already addressed each of these points in his initial Brief [Brief of
Appellees, pp. 28-33] and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
\R. 314-19]. Appellant respectfully directs the Court's attention to those portions of the
aforementioned documents.
3.

Certain statements contained in the Affidavits of Appellant, Bridget Doyle,
James Johnson, Alan Paul, Joyce Olson, Sharon Johnson, Stanley Crump and
Roger Dean were improperly struck.
In his initial Brief, Appellant has explained in detail why certain affidavit statements

of Appellant and others offered in opposition to Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment
should #0/have been stricken. [Brief of Appellant, pp. 14-22]. While Appellant is content to
let this Court review each of the stricken statements from the affidavits and reach a
determination as to whether the trial court had a sufficient legal basis to strike those
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statements, Appellant wishes to reiterate the following points with respect to Appellant's
personal affidavit:
(1)

Appellant's entire affidavit statement was deemed "immaterial" by the trial
court in the March 23, 2010 Ruling. [R. 452-53];

(2)

Appellant's affidavit is highly material insofar as it directly rebuts many of the
Appellees' allegations—allegations that form the basis for the pretext that
Appellant was terminated as a coach for reasons other than exercising his right
to speak publicly about the baseball program;

(3)

If the trial court was willing to accept the entirety of the affidavit testimony
submitted by Appellees in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment as
material to the legal issues, it should have done the same for Appellant.

(4)

Conversely, if all of the factual matters asserted in Appellant's affidavit
(matters directly relating to Appellant's behavior, attitude, interactions,
rationale for objecting to certain procedures, tangible benefits derived from
coaching, etc.) are "immaterial" to the legal issues, then all of Appellees'
affidavit statements relating to those same matters should be deemed
immaterial as well.

4.

This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Appellees on Appellant's defamation and breach of contract claims because
Appellant's Amended Notice of Claim was adequate under applicable law.
In their Brief, Appellees do not take issue with Appellant's analysis of Utah law

governing the required elements of a notice of claim. [Brief of Appellees, p. 45]. Appellees
also agree that under relevant case law interpreting the notice of claim requirements,
Appellant was not required to list his causes of action by name or to meet the standard
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required to state an ordinary claim for relief. [Brief of Appellees, p. 45].
Appellees, however, assert that Appellant was required to include enough facts
pertaining to his defamation and breach of contract claim in order to notify Lehi City that he
would be pursuing those claims. [Brief of Appellees, p. 45]. According to Appellees, because
Appellant's Amended Notice of Claim did not contain language that could be associated with
the concepts of a "contract" or "defamation," Appellant did not provide enough specificity
to apprise Appellees of the "nature of the claim." [Brief of Appellees, pp. 45-56]. Appellees
cite to Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 12, % 14, 155 P.3d 900 in support of their
position.
In his initial Brief, Appellant analyzes Heideman v. Washington City in conjunction with
other relevant Utah decisions involving notice of claim issues including Cedar Prof I Pla^a
L.C v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App 36, 131 P.3d 275, Greene v. Utah Transit Autk, 2001 UT
109, 37 P.3d 1156, Houghton v. Department of Health 2005 UT 63, 125 P.3d 860, and Peoples v.
State, 2004 UT App 328, 100 P.3d 254 and (by analogy) Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675
P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). [Brief of Appellant, pp. 36-44].
The entire point of Appellant's discussion of these cases is to highlight the conflict
between Heideman v. Washington City and the other decisions in regards to the quantum of
specificity or detail required in a notice of claim concerning each potential cause of action,
and to illustrate the uncertainty that results for a plaintiff in formulating the notice of claim.
Appellant also outlined the problems with requiring a notice of claim to include every
possible cause of action (or even facts that could give rise to an unstated cause of action) visa-vis the general rules governing the amending of pleadings and discovery under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. [Brief of Appellant, pp. 44-46].
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Appellant reasserts that Appellees are incorrect in stating that Appellant must forfeit
his defamation and breach of contract claims because such claims (or facts supporting those
claims) were not referenced in the Amended Notice of Claim. On the contrary, Appellant's
general description identifying the broader legal implications of the alleged violations (when
read in conjunction with the brief statement of facts and a statement of potential damages)
in the Amended Notice of Claim is sufficient to strictly comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7401(3)(a)(ii).
5.

Appellant has not appealed the dismissal of his estoppel claim.
Appellant indicated in his initial Brief that he did not appeal the dismissal of his

equitable estoppel claim. [Brief of Appellant, p. 36, n. 3]. Therefore, this issue is not before
the Court
6.

This Court should not affirm summary judgment on Appellant's defamation
claim because a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that statements written
by Appellee MacKintosh and circulated by Appellees Harrison and Bray were
defamatory as a matter of law.
Appellees propose an alternative basis for affirming the trial court's dismissal of

Appellant's defamation claim. Because the trial court dismissed Appellant's defamation claim
on grounds that the Amended Notice of Claim was deficient, it never addressed Appellees'
argument that Appellant had failed to plead facts sufficient to articulate a defamation claim.
On appeal, Appellees renew their argument to this Court that the statements made by
MacKintosh and circulated by Harrison and Bray were not of a sufficiently offensive nature
to meet the legal standard for defamation. [Brief of Appellees, p. 48]. Appellees argue that
"no reasonable juror could conclude that the statements alleged are actually defamatory."
[Brief of Appellees, p. 47]. Appellant disagrees.
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Appellant's Amended Verified Complaint contains an allegation that MacKintosh made
at least four written statements concerning Appellant's decorum in front of and interaction
with children as well as encouraging minor children on his team to "knock kids over." \R.
49]. Bray and Harrison circulated these statements to the Mayor of Lehi City as well as other
employees, volunteers and participants in the sports program. [R. 48]. Utah courts have
consistently held that summary judgment (even where material facts are undisputed) is only
appropriate where no reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party. See e.g.
Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, \ 54, 221 P.3d 219; Parduhn v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93,126, 61
P.3d 982; Ulibarriv. Christenson, 215 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1954).
A reasonable jury could determine that the statements made by MacKintosh and
circulated by Bray and Harrison impeached Appellant's reputation and integrity. Certainly,
for Appellant, such statements were damaging to his standing as a long-term volunteer coach
in the community and were of an especially harmful nature where his volunteer position was
concerned. Accordingly, this Court should not affirm as a matter of law on alternative
grounds that Appellant's articulation of his defamation claim fails.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein and in Appellant's initial Brief, Appellant respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's grant summary judgment in favor of
Appellees and against Appellant on his claims.
Submitted this 21 st day of March 2011.

JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN,
H E I D E M A N , MCKAY, H E U G L Y & O L S E N , L.L.C.,

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant William A. Doyle
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NOTICE CONCERNING ADDENDA

Appellant notes that no additional addenda are included with this Reply Brief.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21 st day of March 2011,1 served two printed copies and
an electronic copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT WILLIAM A.
DOYLE by the following method on the person(s) listed below:

Party/Attorney
David C. Richards
Sarah Elizabeth Spencer
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 W. South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT, 84101
Telephone: 801-323-5000

Method
D Hand Delivery
Mail, postage prepaid
D Overnight Mail
D Fax Transmission

• Email

Facsimile: 801-355-3472

Assistant

fll/Mft/s _
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